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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE BOYER COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, and H. ROGER 
BOYER dba THE BOYER COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
Case No. 14442 
E. KEITH LIGNELL and 
BURTON M. TODD, 
Defendants and 
Respondents, 
REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS 
INTRODUCTION 
This Reply Brief is directed to the Brief filed herein 
by the defendants-respondents, E. Keith Lignell (f,LignelltT) and 
Burton M. Todd ("Todd"). This Reply Brief will address, in turn, 
Points I through VI of the Brief of defendants-respondents. In 
conjunction with that discussion, various of the statements con-
tained in the Statement of Facts of defendants-respondents will 
be addressed and refuted as being contrary to or without support 
in the record. 
-1-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN ADOPTING WITHOUT MODIFICATION THE FINDINGS OF 
FACT PREPARED BY COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS AND, AT BEST,, SUCH FIND-
INGS ARE ENTITLED TO LITTLE WEIGHT, 
In Point I of plaintiffs-appellants' opening Brief, 
the findings of the trial court are challenged as having been 
prepared by counsel for the prevailing party and mechanically 
adopted without modification by the trial court. Defendants ar-
gue that those findings are nevertheless entitled to the pre-
sumption of validity ordinarily attaching to a trial courtf s 
findings for three reasons: (1) The preparation by the pre-
vailing party of proposed findings "is in accord with the long 
established custom of the court." [Brief of Defendants-Respon-
dents, P. 10]. (2) Because plaintiffs submitted objections 
and proposed amendments to the findings in question, the trial 
court twice considered the propriety of those findings; and (3) 
There is no conflict between the court?s Memorandum Decision 
and counsel's proposed findings. All of the foregoing "reasons" 
are facially unmeritorious and unresponsive to the arguments 
contained in Point I of plaintiffs-appellantsf opening Brief. 
The first ground offered by defendants is the practice 
of trial courts to request proposed findings from the prevail-
ing party, a practice which, in the imperfect world in which we 
i 
all function, cannot seriously be challenged. That practice, 
1/ Plaintiffs recognize that our overworked trial bench cannot 
reasonably be expected to prepare all findings and conclusions 
without the assistance of counsel. 
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\ 
however, is not challenged by plaintiffs. That the trial court 
had two opportunities to consider counsel's findings likewise is 
irrelevant. But irrespective of the number of opportunities 
afforded a court to make its own findings, the failure to uti-
lize those opportunities yields the same result -- the findings 
are those of counsel and not the court. Finally, the absence 
of conflict between the court's Memorandum Decision and coun-
sel's findings is immaterial. Carried to its logical conclu-
sion, this argument would permit counsel to draft and the trial 
court to adopt any and all findings not inconsistent with the 
court's ruling, which is often no more than "judgment for defen-
dants ." 
A comparison of the findings entered below and the 
Memorandum Decision reveals that of the contents of the latter, 
all favorable material was included and all unfavorable material 
was excluded in the findings. For example, although the court 
noted that "it has long been the practice of the Real Estate 
Division of the Department of Business Regulation not to license 
2 
corporations as brokers," the findings contain no such recog-
nition. Similarly, the findings prepared by counsel and en-
tered without modification by the trial court embody the find-
ings necessary to sustain virtually all of defendants' affir-
mative defenses, notwithstanding that the court's Memorandum 
decision made mention of almost none of them. In short, de-
fendants' counsel prepared slanted findings which, although 
not inconsistent with the Memorandum Decision, were in every 
2/ Memorandum Decision, R. 187. 
o 
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material respect favorable to defendants. Whereas the findings 
in question are a credit to the advocacy of counsel for defen-
dants, the lower court's mechanical adoption of the same stands 
at odds with the trial court's duty, under Rule 52(a), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, to find the facts for this Court's review. 
To assume that the lower court agreed in each and every 
detail with the twenty-two findings and conclusions drafted by 
counsel stretches the imagination beyond the breaking point. For 
this Court to endow such mechanically adopted findings with the 
presumption of validity properly attaching to the findings of a 
court is to deprive plaintiffs of a meaningful review by this 
Court. 
POINT II 
THE BOYER COMPANY WAS DULY LICENSED AS A REAL ESTATE BROKER. 
The trial court held that The Boyer Company could not 
recover because it was not properly licensed as a real estate 
broker pursuant to Section 61-2-1, Utah Code Ann. (Repl. 1968). 
Significantly, however, the lower court recognized "that it has 
long been the practice of the Real Estate Division of the De-
partment of Business Regulation not to license corporations as 
brokers.ff Memorandum Decision, R. 186-87. Both in their State-
ment of Facts and in Point II of their Argument, defendants 
distort the facts and omit critical facts concerning this issue. 
Defendants assert that The Boyer Company neither ap-
plied for nor held a real estate broker's license at any time 
material to this case. [Appellants' Brief, p. 2.]. Further, 
defendants assert that the broker's license issued in 1972 was 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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issued only to Boyer, the individual, [Appellants* Brief at p. 
14.] Defendants conveniently overlook the fact that Boyerfs ap-
plication for a broker's license dated August 18, 1972 indicated 
that the "Company Name" was "The Boyer Company." [Exhibit 8-P, 
page 2.] Also overlooked is the fact that the license issued 
pursuant to that application was issued to "H. Roger Boyer d/b/a 
The Boyer Company." [Exhibit 8-P, page 6.] Further ignored is 
the fact that the Real Estate Broker's Record maintained by the 
Division of Real Estate with respect to the subject license in-
dicated the name of the broker to be "The Boyer Company." That 
same Record was maintained by the Division of Real Estate con-
tinuously between the issuance of the license in December, 1972 
until the commencement of this action. [Exhibit 8-P, p. 8]. 
Perhaps most significantly, however, the Division's own computer 
3 
master file records as of October 24, 1973 showed a broker's 
license to be issued to H. Roger Boyer under the "company name" 
of "Boyer Co., The." [Exhibit 8-P, p. 13.] 
Mr. Stephen J. Francis, Director of the Real Estate 
Division, was examined extensively concerning Exhibit 8-P. Mr. 
Francis testified again and again that the method by which H. 
Roger Boyer dba The Boyer Company was licensed as evidenced by 
Exhibit 8-P was followwed as a practice by the Department with 
respect to corporations. [T. 279-282]. Indeed, Mr. Francis 
testified that on October 28, 1973, his office regarded The 
Boyer Company as being licensed as a broker. [T. 287.] 
3/ The transactions here at issue occurred during October and 
November, 1973. 
-5-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Defendants offer two Exhibits to demonstrate that the 
Division of Real Estate distinguished between individual and 
corporate licenses, Exhibits 23-D and 24-D. [Appellants1 Brief, 
p. 15.] Exhibit 23-D was withdrawn by defendants and was never 
offered into evidence. [T. 296.] Exhibit 24-D was located in 
the files of the Department by the son of counsel for defendants, 
Mr. Tanner. [T. 293-94.] In introducing that Exhibit, Mr. 
Tanner stipulated that Exhibit 24-D was not introduced as evi-
dence of a general practice of the Department, but only as evi-
dence of the single licensing occasion evidenced by the docu-
ment. [T, 295.] When examined concerning Exhibit 24-D, which 
was offered by defendants as a "genuine" corporate broker's 
license, Mr. Francis testified that the subject license was is-
sued to an individual and did not differ from the license issued 
to H. Roger Boyer dba The Boyer Company. [T. 297-99.] 
In summary, both the lower court in its Memorandum De-
cision and the evidence at trial clearly established (1) that 
the Division in 1973 did not license corporations, (2) that 
a corporation could act as a broker when associated with a duly 
licensed individual, and (3) that both H. Roger Boyer and The 
Boyer Company were duly licensed as brokers pursuant to the pra-
tices of the Division in October and November, 1973. 
Mr. Francis, defendants in their Brief (p. 15), and 
the lower court in its Memorandum Decision recognized that The 
Boyer Company was licensed as a broker pursuant to the practices 
of the Division of Real Estate. Plaintiffs submit that those 
practices are consistent with the applicable statutory provi-
sions. [See Appellants' opening Brief, pp. 17-22.] However, 
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in the unlikely event that this Court determines that the Divi-
sion incorrectly interpreted those statutes, The Boyer Company 
cannot properly be penalized for following the practices of the 
Division of Real Estate, the body charged with administering 
those statutes. Further, Todd and Lignell cannot properly com-
plain of any licensing deficiency with respect to The Boyer Com-
pany, since they dealt only with H. Roger Boyer, admittedly a 
duly licensed broker. Finally, any licensing deficiency with 
respect to The Boyer Company cannot prevent recovery by H. Roger 
Boyer who is acknowledged to have been a duly licensed broker 
[Finding No. 3, R. 194.] 
POINT III 
TODD AND LIGNELL THROUGH THEIR BAD FAITH REFUSAL TO COOPERATE 
AND CONCLUDE THE SALE, PREVENTED THE CONSUMMATION OF THE SALE, 
AND PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR COMMISSION. 
In their Brief, under Point III, defendants press three 
erroneous factual conclusions that they contend preclude re-
covery by plaintiffs. Each will be considered in turn. 
A. Defendants did not act in good faith in their 
dealings with plaintiffs and did not make reasonable efforts to 
consummate the sale. 
Defendants first claim that the Osmond Brothers' ad-
mitted acceptance of Todd and Lignell's "counteroffer" was not 
communicated to them. [Respondents' Brief, p. 23.] Defendants' 
4/ For purposes of this Reply Brief, Todd and Lignell's "counter-
offer" will be treated as the doctors' deletion of the leaseback 
provision contained in the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to 
Purchase submitted by the Osmond Brothers. See Appellants' 
opening Brief, p. 6. 
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argument consists only of a distortion of the testimony of Lew 
Costley. Defendants reason that because Costley testified that 
he discussed the leaseback deletion "within a week or ten days" 
(T. 119) after a date that Costley could not pinpoint (T. 118), 
Boyer could not have communicated the Osmond Brothersf accep-
tance to Todd on October 15, The distortion advanced by defen-
dants is obvious: (1) Costley could not pinpoint the date on 
which he received the modified offer; (2) Costley indicated 
that he discussed the same with Callister within a week or ten 
days after receiving the document [not "at least a week" as 
defendants incorrectly suggest at page 23 of their Brief]; and 
(3) Todd himself acknowledges having had a conversation with 
Boyer in which Boyer at least indicated that the deletion "could 
be worked out." [T, 21,] The various witnesses' testimony con-
cerning the Osmond Brothers1 verbal acceptance of the counter-
offer can be fairly summarized as follows: 
(i) Callister, after being advised of the deletion, 
authorized Boyer to enter into and close the agreement as modi-
fied by Todd and Lignell. [T. 183-84, Callister Depo. pp. 19-
22.] 
(ii) Costlev. after discussing the modification with 
Callister, decided that the Osmond Brothers would enter into the 
agreement as modified by Todd and Lignell. [T. 118-21.] 
(iii) Boyer testified that he advised Todd that the 
agreement as modified was accepted by the Osmond Brothers. [T. 
184-85.] 
(iv) Todd acknowledged that Boyer told him that the 
modified agreement "could be worked out." [T. 21-23.] 
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Perhaps most persuasively, the parties thereafter began working 
towards a closing, with the Osmond Brothers liquidating assets 
to procure the down payment, Boyer procuring a title insurance 
policy, and Todd speaking with MacLeod concerning arrangement of 
the Northwestern mortgage, [Appellants1 opening Brief, p. 7-8.] 
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that there exists little, if any, 
doubt on the record that Boyer communicated the Osmond Brothersf 
acceptance of the counteroffer to Todd, Even the lower court's 
findings are not inconsistent with this conclusion -- the find-
ings below state only that the Osmond Brothers did not accept 
the counteroffer Min a legally binding fashion11 [Finding 11, 
R. 195.] 
Defendants next claim that Todd diligently sought to 
procure the consent of Northwestern Mutual to an assumption of 
that company's mortgage by the Osmond Brothers. [Respondents' 
Brief at pp. 23-28.] The following, all of which is established 
without reliance on any testimony of Boyer and most of which is 
established out of Todd's own mouth, leaves no question that 
Todd refused to cooperate toward the assumption that was essen-
tial to a consummated sale: 
(i) Todd never made any concrete proposal to North-
western concerning the Osmond Brothers' proposed assumption [T. 
79, Todd testifying; MacLeod Depo. pp. 32-35.] 
(ii) Todd never even advised Northwestern that he and 
Lignell had agreed to sell the Shaughnessy Apartments to the Os-
mond Brothers. [T. 156, Todd testifying.] 
(iii) Although Boyer specifically requested that Todd 
seek in writing the consent of Northwestern to assumption, and 
-9-
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even though Todd promised to write such a letter, Todd never 
wrote the letter. [T. 50-51, Todd testifying.] When Todd 
sought a modification of his and Lignellfs loan relationship 
with Northwestern for their own account, however, he predictably 
did so in writing. [T. 57, Todd testifying; Exhibit 12-P.] 
(iv) MacLeod could not recall ToddTs ever having re-
quested that the Osmond Brothers be permitted to assume the 
Northwestern loan. [MacLeod Depo. pp. 32, 25, 41,] 
(v) Todd at trial acknowledged that Boyer advised him 
that the Osmond Brothers were willing to prepay some interest 
and increase the interest rate of the loan to induce Northwestern 
to permit the assumption, but Todd never advised MacLeod of those 
facts. [T. 52-53, Todd testifying.] 
(vi) Todd testified that during his first telephone 
conversation with MacLeod, he indicated that he and Lignell 
really were not interested in obtaining Northwestern's permis-
sion allowing the Osmond Brothers' assumption. [T. 155, Todd 
testifying.] 
(vii) During the s ame time that Todd was supposedly 
attempting to arrange the Osmond Brothers1 assumption, Todd 
was also attempting to arrange a refinancing of the Shaughnessy 
Apartments through Northwestern for his and Lignellrs own ac-
count ! [T. 24-25, 52-56, Todd testifying; Todd Depo. pp. 38-
39.] 
(viii) MacLeod indicated that in each conversation 
with Todd, he left Todd with the initiative, and awaited a con-
crete proposal from Todd, which never came. [MacLeod Depo, pp. 
32-35.] 
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(ix) On November 19, 1973, Todd sent Boyer a letter 
stating that he and Lignell had decided ufor various reasons, not 
to sell the Shaughnessy Apartments," [Exhibit 5-P.] Todd in 
that same letter stated that he had so indicated to Boyer !fover 
the past several weeks.11 During that same past several weeks, 
Todd would now have the Court believe that he was diligently 
seeking to consummate the sale, 
(x) Todd testified that at least a "minor reason" in 
his decision not to sell the property was a potential adverse 
tax consequence of such sale in the amount of $145,000.00 [T. 
160; Todd testifying; Todd Depo. pp. 44-45.] At no time did 
Todd ever claim that the readiness, willingness, or ability of 
the Osmond Brothers to purchase the property ever played any 
role in the decision not to sell. 
As the foregoing makes clear, Todd never seriously at-
tempted to arrange the essential assumption by Northwestern and 
decided not to sell the property in the face of a ready, willing, 
and able buyer. We submit that Todd's attempt to refinance the 
Shaughnessy for his and Lignellfs own account while he was sup-
posedly attempting to effect another arrangement for the Osmond 
Brothers is sufficient to establish his patent lack of good 
faith. Defendants cannot take refuge in any claim of disputed 
testimony resolved by the court against plaintiffs, for the 
testimony upon which plaintiffs' rely is that of Todd himself. 
B. The prospective buyers were ready, willing, and 
able. 
At pages 30-31 of their Brief, defendants suggest (1) 
-11-
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that Northwestern would not approve the Osmond Brothers' assump-
tion absent some incentive to Northwestern and (2) that MacLeod 
did not have final authority to approve an assumption. It is 
true that MacLeod indicated that, in negotiations with Todd, he 
would have sought some improvement in Northwestern's loan posi-
tion. [MacLeod Depo. p. 27,] MacLeod indicated, however, that 
if Todd had seriously requested an assumption by the Osmond Bro-
thers , the same would have been granted without any modification 
or incentive to Northwestern. [MacLeod Depo. pp. 40-41.] Even 
if MacLeod had requested additional consideration in return for 
the assumption, the Osmond Brothers stood ready to prepay some 
interest and increase the loan interest rate. [T. 52-53, Todd 
testifying.] Todd, however, never advised MacLeod of that fact. 
[T. 52-53, Todd testifying.] Todd is in no position now to ar-
gue that an assumption could not have been arranged absent ad-
ditional consideration when he admits that he never advised 
Northwestern of the additional consideration that the Osmond 
Brothers were ready, willing, and able to provide. 
Defendants weakly suggest that in any event, MacLeod 
had no authority to permit the assumption. MacLeod, who was the 
Regional Manager of the Mortgage Loan Department of Northwestern, 
was not an impotent functionary. [MacLeod Depo, pp. 2-3.] Mac 
Leod testified that he had reasonable success in having his rec-
ommendations approved, [MacLeod Depo. p. 39] and that pragma-
tically, he would have recommended the Osmond Brothers' assump-
tion lf[a]nd as to its being approved, going back to your earlier 
question as to what is my success ratio, my company is a pragma-
tic company,ff [MacLeod Depo, p. 70.] Most importantly, however, 
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approval of MacLeod's recommendation was never sought because 
Todd never seriously sought such approval. [MacLeod Depo. pp. 
32-35.] 
C. The Offer was not Impossible to Perform. 
At pages 31 to 34 of their Brief, defendants argue that 
the unwillingness of Northwestern to remove Todd and Lignell!s 
dental building from the mortgage covering that building as well 
as the Shaughnessy rendered a sale impossible or at least con-
stituted a mutual mistake of fact between the parties. Those 
arguments are legally and factually untenable. First, neither 
impossibility of performance nor mutual mistake was pleaded by 
defendants with respect to this subject. [Amended Answer, R. 
166-171.] See Rules 8(c) and 9(b), Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. Further, even the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law drafted by defendants! counsel make no mention of such im-
possibility or mistake. 
Most significantly, however, the facts adduced at trial 
do not support those belated arguments. First, the Earnest 
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase contained no provision re-
quiring severance of the dental building from the mortgage of 
Northwestern. [Exhibit 2-P.] Such severance was therefore 
clearly not something upon which Todd and Lignell could insist. 
Second, Todd never even mentioned to Boyer prior to the doctors1 
refusal to sell that severance of the dental building was in 
any way a problem. [T. 203-04.] Boyerfs testimony on this 
point is uncontroverted. Hence, the Osmond Brothers were never 
given an opportunity by Todd to resolve this difficulty, if it 
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was a difficulty. Third, Todd is in no position now to claim 
that severance of the dental building was a problem, for Todd on 
three separate occasions testified that neither he nor MacLeod 
regarded it as a problem. [T. 30-31, 42, 49-50, Todd testifying.] 
D. Plaintiffs1 Authorities are Applicable Here. 
At pages 35 to 39 of their Brief, defendants assert 
that because the listing letter [Exhibit 1-P] conditioned Boyerfs 
commission on a consummated sale, the authorities offered by 
plaintiffs are inapposite. That argument, even if meritorious, 
would have no effect upon The Boyer Company's right to recover 
pursuant to the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase [Ex-
hibit 2-P], for the latter was not conditioned on a consummated 
sale. 
Plaintiffs invite the Court to review Hoyt v. Wasatch 
Homes, Inc., 1 Utah 2d 9, 261 P.2d 927 (1953). There as defen-
dants recognize, the Court considered whether a broker could 
recover pursuant to a special listing contract notwithstanding 
5/ Defendants argue at page 39 of their Brief that the consum-
mated sale requirement was to carry through to the Earnest Money 
Agreement, an argument that is directly contrary to the court's 
finding number 12 (R. 195) that with respect to the Earnest Money 
Agreement, "no verbal statement made by anyone relative to this 
transaction shall be construed to be a part of this transaction 
unless incorporated in writing herein." Defendants1 falsely as-
sert that plaintiffs' counsel stipulated that the consummated 
sale provision of the listing letter was intended to carry through 
to the Earnest Money Agreement. We invite the Court to make its 
own judgment as to what counsel for Boyer stipulated. [T. 44.] 
Finally, it must be remembered that Boyer the individual entered 
into the Earnest Money Agreement. As defendants point out at 
page 29 of their Brief, the distinction between the individual 
and corporation should be recognized. 
£/ Defendants1 Brief at p. 37. 
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that a sale was not consummated. The Court held that the broker 
could recover because the seller's refusal to cooperate towards 
a sale excused that condition to payment of the broker's com-
mission. 1 Utah 2d at 14-15, 261 P.2d at 930. Defendants' at-
tempt to distinguish Hoyt by claiming, contrary to the fact, 
that in Hoyt a binding contract was entered into between buyer 
and seller. In Hoyt, the parties entered into an agreement which 
did not prescribe payment terms and recited "terms and conditions 
* * * subject to adjustment agreeable to the parties." After 
further negotiations, the parties did come to an oral agreement 
as to such terms. By established law and defendants' own theory, 
the preliminary and oral nature of the agreement in Hoyt ren-
dered it unenforceable. In Hoyt, as just noted, the parties en-
tered into an agreement that left payment terms to future agree-
ment. As defendants note at page 42 of their Brief, the ab-
sence of agreement as to all terms precluded a binding contract. 
R. J. Daum Const. Co. v. Child, 122 Utah 194, 247 P.2d 817 
(1952); Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597 (1962). 
As was the case here, however, the parties in Hoyt entered into 
a subsequent oral agreement concerning the open terms. Here, 
the Court is presented with a written offer and counteroffer 
and an oral acceptance. Hoyt cannot be distinguished. As re-
cently as December, 1976, this Court reaffirmed the Hoyt rule 
that under a special listing agreement, if "the sale is not 
completed because of lack of cooperation or obstruction by the 
listor . . ., the agent is nevertheless entitled to his commis-
sion." Davis v. Heath Development Co., 558 P.2d 495, 496 (Utah 
1976). 
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POINT IV 
DEFENDANTS COUNTEROFFER WAS ACCEPTED BY THE OSMOND BROTHERS 
At pages 40 to 41 of their Brief, defendants claim 
that the doctorsf counteroffer was never accepted by the Osmond 
Brothers. As noted above, it is not disputed that the Osmond 
Brothers instructed Boyer to accept the counteroffer and the 
evidence is overwhelming that Boyer advised Todd of that ac-
ceptance. See pages 8-9, supra. 
Defendants next suggest that the acceptance was in-
effective because it occurred more than one day after the counter-
offer. The Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase did 
provide that acceptance of the offer by the Osmond Brothers was 
conditioned on acceptance within one day. There is no evidence 
that the doctors' counteroffer was so conditioned. [Exhibit 2-
P.] 
The fact that the Osmond Brothers f acceptance was not 
in writing is immaterial for, as indicated below, a written 
contract is not required --a ready, willing, and able purchaser 
was the only prerequisite to the brokers1 commission. 
Defendants next incredibly argue that there is no 
evidence that Boyer had authority to accept the counteroffer 
on behalf of the Osmond Brothers. To quote defendants, ff[d]ur-
ing all times relevant to this matter, Boyer was the agent for 
the Osmond Brothers and was acting for and on their behalf in 
the proposed purchase. (Finding No. 3, R. 94, T, 318, Callister 
< 
Depo. pp. 44-45)ff [Respondents' Brief at p. 3.] Callister and 
Costley testified without contradiction that they instructed 
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Boyer to accept the doctors1 counteroffer. [Callister Depo. 
pp. 19-22; T. 118-21,] 
POINT V 
LACK OF AN "ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT" DOES NOT PRECLUDE 
PLAINTIFFS1 RECOVERY 
Defendants1 argument at pages 42 to 44 of their Brief 
misconceives plaintiffs1 theory. Hoyt v. Wasatch Homes, Inc., 1 
Utah 2d 9, 261 P.2d 927 (1953), upon which plaintiffs rely, 
stands for the following propositions: 
1. A broker under a special listing agreement may 
recover his commission notwithstanding the absence of a consum-
mated sale or enforceable contract to sell if (a) he produces 
a ready, willing, and able purchaser who orally agrees to pur-
chase the subject property, and (b) the seller refuses to co-
operate towards the consummation of a sale. 
2. A broker under "the usual printed form Earnest 
Money Receipt and Agreement" may recover absent an enforceable 
written agreement between buyer and seller if the broker pro-
duces a ready, willing, and able purchaser who orally agrees to 
purchase the subject property. 
H. Roger Boyer is entitled to recovery under the first 
proposition; The Boyer Company is entitled to recover under the 
second proposition. Hoyt, which dealt with a special listing 
letter and Earnest Money Agreement in substance identical to 
those here presented, cannot be distinguished from the facts 
here presented. Hoyt held that the broker was entitled to his 
commission under both the special listing agreement and the 
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Earnest Money Agreement absent a written, enforceable contract 
to convey, 
POINT VI 
PLAINTIFFS' CONDUCT ENTITLES THEM TO THEIR COMMISSION 
Defendants at pages 44 to 46 apparently argue that 
Boyer did not work hard enough to close the sale. We are un-
aware of, and defendants do not cite, any authority that supports 
this theory. Boyer produced a purchaser who was both willing 
and able, even eager, to purchase a million dollar building. 
Had defendants been able to accomplish this simple task, they 
surely would not have engaged Boyer. Defendants suggest that 
Boyer should have called MacLeod more frequently notwithstanding 
that the testimony is uncontroverted that MacLeod would talk 
only to Todd and not to Boyer (MacLeod Depo. pp. 8, 10-11, 60-
61, 64-65, 71) and indeed complained to Todd that Boyer had 
called him (T. 75, Todd testifying). Defendants' other feeble 
assertions, most of which have no support in the record, require 
no comment. Boyerfs testimony is uncontroverted that, in addi-
tion to conveying communications between buyer and seller and 
attempting unsuccessfully to communicate with MacLeod, Boyer 
performed financial analyses concerning the property, met with 
the buyers and sellers at the property, prepared a written of-
fer for the buyers, handled the earnest money deposited by the 
buyers, hand carried first the offer and later the counteroffer 
from Salt Lake City to Costley in Ogden, procured a preliminary 
title insurance binder, met with the sellers to discuss potential 
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incentives to Northwestern, and a host of other activities con-
ducive to a closing. [T. 177-190,] If Boyer did not work hard 
enough to earn plaintiffs1 commission, every broker in the State 
of Utah would be a charge of the States' welfare system. In any 
event, the broker's obligation is to procure a purchaser, not 
work hard enough to satisfy his sellers, 
CONCLUSION 
Hoyt is virtually identical, legally and factually, to 
the facts here presented. Under Hoyt, plaintiffs are entitled 
to recover their commission. The lower court must be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /Q day of March, 1977, 
MARTINEAU & MAAK 
^ - - - - - - • , • ' < 
~C. Keith Rooker 
/ * : • > -
hficial Life Tower 
South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
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